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Volume 53 Number 1 | January to June 2012

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SILLIMAN JOURNAL

Volume 53 Number 1 2012





The SILLIMAN JOURNAL is published twice a year under the auspices of Silliman University, Dumaguete City, Philippines. Entered as second class mail matter at Dumaguete City Post Office on September 1, 1954.

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ISSN 0037-5284

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Annual subscription rates are at PhP600 for local subscribers, and \$35 for overseas subscribers. Subscription and orders for current and back issues should be addressed to

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Silliman University Main Library
6200 Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental
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Issues are also available in microfilm format from

University Microfilms International
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Or go to the SILLIMAN JOURNAL website at www.su.edu.ph/sillimanjournal

Cover and book design by Ian Rosales Casocot
Cover painting, "Sabong 3" by F. Jordan Carnice, courtesy of the artist.
Printing by SU Printing Press, Dumaguete City

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NOTICE TO AUTHORS

PUBLICATION GUIDELINES

SILLIMAN JOURNAL welcomes submission of scholarly papers, research studies, brief reports in all fields from both Philippine and foreign scholars, but papers must have some relevance to the Philippines, Asia, or the Pacific. All submissions are refereed.

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SILLIMAN JOURNAL likewise welcomes submissions of "Notes," which generally are briefer and more tentative than full-length articles. Reports on work-in-progress, queries, updates, reports of impressions rather than research, responses to the works of others, even reminiscences are appropriate here.

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“Faith’ is a fine invention/When Gentlemen can
see—/But Microscopes are prudent/
In an Emergency.”

Emily Dickenson
c. 1860

“A teacher is better than two books.”

German Proverb

“To teach is to learn twice over.”

Joseph Joubert
Pensées (1842)



EDITORIAL NOTES

Welcome to this issue of the *Silliman Journal*, a familiar mix of science and the humanities. Mix? *Ouch*, the scientists might say. To distinguish science from the humanities is a “tired old point,” says blogger Greg Frost-Arnold (2007), continuing: *Both the sciences and the humanities seek understanding; both offer explanations of various bits of the world. At a very abstract level, though, the kind of things each tries to explain is different.* Obviously, for example, piano pedagogy is a very different kind of thing than pest incidence and certainly, for example,

emancipation psychology is very different from *E. coli*. But we have all these in this issue, and more.

We begin with two papers from scientists—the first on pests in vegetables, the other on peanut extract. First, the agricultural chemist Prof. Susan Calumpang and colleagues at the National Crop Protection Center in Los Baños, Laguna, Philippines investigate the incidence of pests and natural enemies in rice-tagbak and vegetable cropping systems, without the use of insecticides, with the premise that indigenous cultural practices in pest management provide a valuable resource for sustainable agriculture.

In the second paper, Jonathan Barcelo of Saint Louis University in Baguio, Philippines also has some good news, finding specifically that “peanut anthocyanin extract reduces cell surface hydrophobicity and inhibits the hemagglutination of *E. coli* in a time-dependent and dose-dependent mechanism through nonspecific interaction with the bacterial cell membrane.”

Our third piece of research is by the social psychology professor Eric Manalastas who studies nationwide cigarette smoking among lesbian, gay, and bisexual Filipino youth and strongly recommends a gender x sexual orientation intersectional analysis of health risk behaviors such as cigarette smoking, after finding that young lesbian and bisexual Filipina women had higher rates of ever-trying tobacco, had higher prevalence of current smoking, and smoked more cigarette sticks per day, compared to heterosexual women. Eric also found that Filipino gay and bisexual youth had the highest cigarette smoking prevalence of all four subgroups and discusses possible implications for tobacco use intervention.

This research is followed by two papers related to the academe—one on the use of e-learning tools among faculty members and the other paper on an alternative approach to teaching piano. College of Computer Studies Dean Dave Marcial finds a high level of familiarity with e-learning tools, but that integration of these into teaching is rare. College of Performing and Visual Arts Dean Sue Suarez samples eight piano students who are on probationary status and suggests that a practice before theory approach provides better learning than does the more traditional theory before practice model.

Then, Filipino philosopher Jeffrey Ocaj “revolutionizes Freud” in analyzing Herbert Marcuse’s ideas on domination, resistance, and emancipation. Jeff argues that “Freud’s theory of instincts provided Marcuse with a model for a psychology of domination and resistance, and a model to think anew the philosophical conditions

of emancipation: the agent of social transformation is the biological individual” and that Marcuse’s appropriation of Freud’s theory of instincts explained why the transition from capitalism to socialism did not happen, why, especially in the 1930s, the revolutionary class had been dissolved and became conformist, and how this conformism was even extended into the postwar era. I invite readers to consider Jeff’s arguments.

Finally, historian Prof. Regan Jomao-as analyzes the Roman Catholic Church in a Philippines under Spanish rule and speaks of the “discontents” of Philippine society. Regan also cites Freud, particularly his views of religion and theories of aggression.

NOTES SECTION

The notes section has an essay also by a historian, Michael Hawkins of Creighton University, who examines justice as documented in the local press when the Philippines was under American military rule during the period from 1898 to 1913. Michael gives an interesting analysis, but the accounts are graphic—parental guidance needed.

BOOK REVIEW

Our lone book review is by English teacher Lady Flor Partosa of colleague Ian Casocot’s *Heartbreak & Magic: Stories of Fantasy and Horror* (2011). In reviewing Ian’s stories, Parts says that “history ceases to become a list of cold facts and becomes a backdrop of his narratives,” making Ian himself the magician.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank our many contributors to this issue of Silliman Journal who have all made it a truly multidisciplinary one. I also acknowledge with gratitude our reviewers, editorial board, and editorial staff. Special thanks go to poet and creative writing program alumni F. Jordan Carnice for giving *SJ* permission to use “Sabong 3” for the cover art for this issue. I leave you all with the words of La Bruyère in *Characters* (1688): “A mediocre mind thinks it writes divinely; a good mind thinks it writes reasonably.”

Margaret Helen F. Udarbe
Editor

Revolutionizing Freud: Marcuse on the Psychology of Domination, Resistance, and Emancipation

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Following Marx, Herbert Marcuse believes that the internal logic of overproduction and excessive consumption, combined with massive pauperization will lead to the self-destruction of capitalist society. But the political events of mid-20th century made Marcuse realize that Marx's notion of the necessary transition from capitalism to socialism did not happen. What happened instead were the integration of the proletariat into the status quo, the stabilization of capitalism, the bureaucratization of socialism, and the absence of a revolutionary agent for progressive social change. For this reason, Marcuse appropriated Freud's theory of instincts in order to provide Marxism an anthropological basis. I argue that Freud's theory of instincts provided Marcuse with a model for a psychology of domination and resistance, and a model to think anew the philosophical conditions of emancipation: the agent of social transformation is the biological individual. I argue further that Marcuse's appropriation of Freud's theory of instincts is aimed to explain why the transition from capitalism to socialism did not happen, why, especially in the 1930s, the revolutionary class had been dissolved and became conformist, and how this conformism was even extended into the postwar era.

KEYWORDS: reality principle, surplus repression, performance principle, *Ananke*, sublimation, repressive desublimation, False Needs, domination, resistance, emancipation

Toward the end of the second half of the twentieth century, with the help of his three philosophers of predilection, namely, Heidegger, Hegel, and Marx, Marcuse constructed a philosophical model that was to provide the conceptual language and the framework to develop a new theory of emancipation, realizing the hope of the Enlightenment project but under contemporary conditions. Heidegger's historical *Dasein* gave a model for the possibility of the individual becoming disposed to radical action. Hegel provided the model to analyze the process of social crisis, and the necessity of the passage to a new phase of social organization. Furthermore, Hegel's master-slave dialectic allows Marcuse to view labor as the basis of self-consciousness. The early Marx focuses on work as the locus of domination, alienation, and the place from which emancipation can be realized. But here a problem arises: whilst Hegel's dialectic is supposed to point to the inevitability of crisis and transformation, in fact the empirical "slaves" of the society of the 1930s not only failed to overthrow a capitalistic order on its knees. Worse still, they turned in ever increasing numbers from the mid-1930s onwards towards parties and their fanatical leaders whose programmes are the exact opposite of the full human emancipation. This historical conundrum led Marcuse, together with the other members of the Frankfurt School, to become increasingly interested in the psychological dimension of domination and emancipation. This turn to the philosophy of domination and emancipation can be made sense of more specifically from the perspective of Marcuse's Marxist assumptions.

Like Marx, Marcuse believes that the internal logic of overproduction and excessive consumption, combined with massive pauperization, leads to the self-destruction of capitalist society. The capitalist system of overproduction coupled with excessive consumption creates insatiable individuals whose needs and desires are impossible to satisfy. This is dangerous for Marcuse because as the society produces more and more to address the yearnings of unquenchable individuals, a discrepancy between the purchasing power of the individuals and the volume of goods and services produced by the capitalist society necessarily ensues at some point in time. Marcuse believes that this would cause disintegration of the capitalist order. But the self-destruction of capitalism that Marcuse, following Marx, predicted, did not as a matter of fact necessarily lead to socialism. Contrary to what Marx predicted, Marcuse in the middle of the twentieth century began to realize that the transition from capitalism to socialism did not happen. What happened instead were the integration of the

proletariat into the status quo, the stabilization of capitalism, the bureaucratization of socialism (as in the case of the former Soviet Union), and the absence of a revolutionary agent for progressive social change. Marcuse discovered that the capitalist society had developed a technique that effectively dissolves “opposition” in the society and reduces the individuals into acquiescence or even complicity. Thus, dialectic, which was supposed to be unstoppable and necessarily leads to a free society of free producers, instead produces a conformist society of complying individuals.

This problem explains why Marcuse attempted to complement his revitalization of Marxism with Freud. Marcuse’s attempt to revitalize Marxism through Heidegger and Hegel, therefore, did not suffice. It needs another decisive piece to complete the methodological puzzle. Marcuse found it in Freud’s psychoanalysis. This is now the main thrust of this paper: an engagement with the way in which Marcuse attempted to provide Marxism an anthropological basis by going into the depth dimension of the human psyche, through an appropriation of Freud’s theory of instincts. Marcuse’s intention here is to explain why the transition from capitalism to socialism did not happen, why, especially in the 1930s, the revolutionary class had been dissolved and became conformist, and how this conformism was even extended into the postwar era. Equally, however, this paper argues that Freud’s theory of instincts provided Marcuse with a model for a psychology of domination and resistance, and a model to think anew the philosophical conditions of emancipation: the agent of social transformation is the biological individual or, to use Marcuse’s words, the individual with the “new sensibility.”

THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF FREUD’S THEORY OF HUMAN INSTINCTS¹

Central to Freud’s theory of instincts, as Marcuse reconstructs it, is the idea that there is an inherent antagonism between the satisfaction of human instincts and individual freedom on the one hand and the development of civilization on the other. According to Freud, this antagonism is an antagonism between individual and cultural demands, or between sexuality and civilization.² In his exposition on Marcuse’s *Eros and Civilization*, K. Daniel Cho observes that Freud’s unrelenting position on the necessity of the repression of instincts is one of the key concepts in Marcuse’s engagement with Freud.

Cho writes: "Marcuse's contention in *Eros and Civilization* is with Freud's belief that civilization is coterminus with the repression of the drives: 'The notion that a non-repressive civilization is impossible is a cornerstone of Freudian theory'."³ However, Freud believes that the repression of the instincts is beneficial to mankind because it humanizes the animal man and, is therefore the condition of progress to civilization. Freud argues that in order for civilization to thrive, the demands of human instincts must be constantly held in check by socially powerful norms. For Freud, this normative standard is necessary for two reasons: first, it prevents the dissolution of social bond by keeping in check the destructive forces of human instincts, and second, this process of repression also triggers mechanisms of sublimation and channeling of instinctual energies into forms of psychic development responsible for cognitive and moral progress. Whilst Marcuse adopts the framework and the language of Freud's social theory, he also questions whether the extent of repression of the instincts is excessive or indeed necessary.⁴ Before we consider this criticism of Freud, however, we must first consider the explanation Freud gave for the necessity of the repressiveness in civilization, which is twofold, namely, biological and economic.

Firstly, Freud believes that civilization, that is, the very possibility of a life in common for human individuals, and the possibility of any cognitive, moral, and instrumental progress, begins with the twofold systematic repression of the primary instincts of human beings, to wit: [a] the repression of life-instincts (Eros), which tend at first to focus on external gratification with exclusive object, the repression and rechanneling of these erotic instincts ensues in durable and expanding group relations; and [b] the repression of the destructive instincts (Thanatos). Left unchecked, the pleasure in destruction obviously destroys all possibility of life in common, but rechanneled, it can be made to serve positive purpose; it leads to the mastery of human beings and nature, to the individual and social morality.⁵ Let us summarize the basic assumptions underlying this theory of the social bond and historical evolution.

Eros, whose elemental goal is the preservation of life, and Thanatos, whose primary goal is the destruction of life, are the two mechanisms immanent within the human psyche that operate in the process of releasing tension.⁶ Eros does it through the immediate satisfaction of sexual desires, while Thanatos does it through destruction or death. Both Eros and Thanatos work under the pleasure principle, that is, seek immediate and full gratification. This necessity is imperative

inasmuch as these instinctual mechanisms obey organic laws. For Freud, this is the dynamics of life; life is a “conflict and compromise between these two trends.”⁷ However, these two conflicting forces within the individual are brute organic forces that stem from the individual’s organic makeup and therefore initially disregard the necessity of life in common. They are therefore perilous and would cause destruction to the individual in particular and to life in common in general if left unchecked since the individual satisfaction they seek necessarily runs counter to any basic functional demand of social life, notably the necessity of individual achievement to encroach upon the sphere of others, or for long-term commitment to be upheld. A society where the demands of Eros and Thanatos receive immediate satisfaction is structurally inconceivable. No social life can maintain itself if individual instincts are left unchecked. Thus, the individual has to restrain his or her socially destructive instincts by conforming to some socially useful norms. This is why Freud fully accepts and justifies the necessity and virtue of repression. Eros and Thanatos, which work under the pleasure principle, must bow to the rule of the reality principle.⁸ The “reality principle” is the set of demands the individual has to take into consideration, and which society enforces upon her/him via rules, norms, and prohibitions simply so that human life can be maintained given the limitations and constraints that stem from the natural and social environments. Freud argues: “Civilization has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man’s aggressive instincts and to hold the manifestation of them in check by physical reaction-formation.”

Freud also believes that the repression of the human instincts is enforced and sustained by scarcity or *Ananke*.¹⁰ More specifically, repression of the primary instincts is demanded by the situation of scarcity, in which the human individual finds him or herself, that is, the difficulty for the human individual to find the means of subsistence given that Nature has not provided him/her with the kind of structural and organic connection to the environment that is granted to other living beings. This irreducible situation of existential precariousness that is both economic and organic is captured in the concept of *Ananke*. As Edward Hyman emphasizes, *Ananke* is the underlying principle of the reality principle.¹¹ *Ananke* in particular forces the human being to work in order to survive, in order to simply put food on the table, clothes on his/her skin, and shelter over his/her head. And since the society in the past “...has not means enough to support the life of its members without work on their part, it must

see to it that the number of these members is restricted and their energies directed away from sexual activities on to their work."¹² In other words, *Ananke* constrains not just the external activities of individuals, but also and indeed primordially their very instinctual life. In his engagement with Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization*, Barry Katz puts it aptly:

Chief among the environmental variables that condition the prevailing repressive organization of the instincts is the brute fact of material need, *Ananke*: the condition of scarcity that has dominated the world history of civilized society has dictated that a considerable part of the instinctual (libidinal) endowment of the population be diverted from enjoyment into productive labor.¹³

"Work," for Freud, is one of the foundations (the other is Eros) of society.¹⁴ Freud says that individuals "come together," i.e., live in society, first because they are forced to do so by economic necessity (*Ananke*) and second because they want to do so to acquire their sexual objects (Eros). In fact, for Freud, as for Marcuse, civilization is first of all progress in work—that is, work for the procurement and augmentation of the necessities (*Ananke*) of life.¹⁵ This necessity of work comes into direct opposition with the erotic instincts, and thus demands a thorough repression of libido, because direct libidinal fulfilment comes in the way of efficient work. The pleasure-seeking instincts must give way to non-libidinal work.¹⁶ C. Fred Alford summarizes this mechanism concisely: "Culture demands the sublimation of the erotic drives so that the psychic energy that would otherwise be directed toward immediate gratification *should* be inhibited in its aim and rechanneled into work."¹⁷ Erotic impulses can thus provide the source of the energy that is "redirected" in work. This gives a more precise image of the repression demanded by *Ananke*: not destruction of instincts, but rechanneling.

The repression of the human instincts by socially useful norms is precisely what is meant by the inhibition of the pleasure principle by the reality principle. To see now how this dialectic of pleasure and reality principle plays out in the formation of a subject, let us discuss briefly Freud's account of the opposition between the "pleasure principle" and "reality principle", and between the "ego" and the *id*.

On the one hand, the pleasure principle is the governing principle of the *id*; the *id* is that part of the human psyche that remains entirely unconscious. On the other, the reality principle is the governing principle of the ego. The ego is that part of the primary psychic processes that has been modified due to its direct contact with the

external world, both the material world and the social world (in the form of the parents). Freud summarizes this basic dichotomy by saying that the ego represents reason and common sense, while the *id* represents passion.¹⁸ Now, the instincts of the *id*, being governed by the pleasure principle, press for immediate satisfaction at all costs.¹⁹ This is the nature of the *id*. It seeks to satisfy its desires without any consideration of the possible danger for the individual. The ego intervenes at this point to take into account the demands and constraints from material reality and the social world. As the conscious part of the *id*, the ego mediates between the demands of the *id* and the external world.²⁰ Expressed in more general, philosophical terms, and as Adorno puts it, reason (*ego*) supervises the instinctual behavior of man (*id*).²¹ The ego uses the observation of the external world through the senses and its memory of past experience and more particularly the knowledge of social rules and prohibitions gained through past social interactions, to capture instances of harmless satisfaction and impose them upon the *id*. In this way, the *id* is bridled by way of delaying its satisfaction or even modifying its aim. This is the basic mechanism underlying what Freud calls “sublimation” of the instincts.²² When this happens, the inhibition of the pleasure principle by the reality principle becomes complete.

However, the inhibition of the pleasure principle by the reality principle does not mean that the yearning for pleasure is completely abandoned. It is only postponed for the sake of a long-lasting and more secure pleasure in the future. As Freud argues in his seminal essay *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, the postponement of satisfaction is only a step on the long, indirect road to pleasure.²³ This renunciation of instinctual satisfaction is characterized by momentary absence of pleasure and a coming back of the object of pleasure.²⁴ Inasmuch as there is a coming back of the object of pleasure, it can be inferred that there is a “pleasurable” ending in this process. However, it is essential to stress that this process of sublimation in fact means that in the end happiness is attained. Freud insists that happiness is impossible. Civilization in the end categorically implies “control and domination”, the denial of human freedom and happiness for the sake of survival and the possibility of life in common. Freud believes that life is basically suffering and that the dynamics of nature as a whole proves this point. He said there is no possibility at all that happiness can be achieved since all regulations of the universe militate against it. As he writes in a famous passage:

We are threatened with suffering from three directions: from our own body, which is doomed to decay and dissolution and which cannot even do without pain and anxiety as warning signals; from the external world, which may rage against us with overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction; and finally from our relation to other men. The suffering which comes from this last source is perhaps more painful than any other.²⁵

In regard to the first two sources, our judgment cannot hesitate long. It forces us to acknowledge those sources of suffering and to submit to the inevitable. We shall never completely master nature; and our bodily organism itself a part of that nature, will always remain a transient structure with a limited capacity for adaptation and achievement.²⁶

As regards the third, the social source of suffering...we do not admit it at all; we cannot see why the regulations made by ourselves should not, on the contrary, be a protection and a benefit for every one of us.²⁷

What Freud wants to elucidate at this point is not only the fact that human beings are destined to suffer, but also the cause which gives rise to this suffering—suffering is a direct upshot of the repression of instincts and such repression is an ineliminable condition of human life given the necessity for human beings to live in common. Freud never repudiates this repression. He argues that it is necessary in order to preserve life. Indeed, through the process of sublimation, which channels libidinal energies onto acceptable objects, repression is the key to civilization. In other words, the price for the preservation of life and culture is happiness. Momentary pleasure, which bespeaks of the oscillation of pleasure and displeasure in life, is the best that human beings can ever have in terms of happiness. It characterizes what Freud maintains as the eternal antagonism between the pleasure principle and the reality principle.

One final key concept needs to be introduced. In *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud asks the following questions: “What means does civilization employ in order to inhibit the aggressiveness (of the human instincts) which opposes it, to make it harmless, to get rid of it, perhaps?”²⁸ What is the basic psychic mechanism underlying the repression of instinctual demands and sublimation? Let us deal with this query before discussing Marcuse’s engagement with Freud.

Aggressive and instinctual forces in individuals can be tamed as the ego opposes to their immediate and urgent demands, the demands stemming from social life, the rules and prohibitions learnt through social interactions, notably the moral education and punishment exercised by the parents on the young child. This process of moral and social learning leads to the internalization of social norms and commands, the creation in the ego of a psychic instance

that represents within these external social norms. Instinctual forces are thus tamed by the ego thanks to the institution of the “superego” and “conscience.” The ego is the conscious part caught between the demands of the *id*, of which it is the superego which is the moral component of the ego, and which was formed following the ego’s contacts with social objects. In *The Question of Lay Analysis: An Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, Freud describes the superego as a special agency of the ego, which turns against the ego as it imposes upon it a kind of moralistic rule: conscience.²⁹ The superego is that specific agency in the human psyche that appropriates the reality principle stemming from the demands of external reality and exacts control over the ego to repress the *id*, the seat of the pleasure principle. The superego and the *id* are mediated by the ego. In Freud’s analysis, the ego is thus sandwiched between the *id* and the superego. It plays the significant role in striking a balance between the selfish demands of the *id* and the imposition of a stern moralistic rule as expressed by the superego. When overburdened by its tasks, the ego exerts defense mechanisms such as denial and repression. Conscience, through the superego, watches over the ego’s actions and intentions and exercises censorship on them.³⁰ In this manner, the aggressive instincts in individuals are weakened or disarmed and a well-functioning human society becomes possible. But as can be seen, this requires an unconditional submission of the ego to the superego. This makes Freud argue that any form of perversion must be tabooed. Perversion is not only detestable but also something monstrous and terrifying in what it harbors.³¹ This is because perversion represents an expression of the rebellion of the pleasure principle against the reality principle. The latter, however, subjugates the aggressive and brute forces in humans (Eros and Thanatos), a subjugation that is the condition for progress in civilization and that facilitates the smooth functioning of the entire system. This explains why Freud insists so strongly that the human instincts must be repressed at all costs.

What results from this process is the “sense of guilt”, the sense that the ego has of being watched over by the superego in every one of its actions and intentions.³² But Freud is convinced that this is how civilization ought to be, that the aggressive instincts should always be held in check and that the sense of guilt must remain permanent or indeed must be heightened. Every little advance in civilization should carry along with it a proportionate degree of guilt. For Freud, this is the price of civilization. But as said, this is at the cost of happiness.

MARCUSE'S CRITICAL APPROPRIATION OF FREUD

In contradiction to Freud's claim that human beings cannot live under the pleasure principle, that happiness cannot be attained, Marcuse's fundamental belief is that the goal of life is not merely security but pleasure.³³ As he writes, the struggle for existence is originally the struggle for pleasure. In turn therefore, Marcuse believes that a non-repressive society, that is, free and happy society, is the goal of human history. Or, to put it differently, the content of emancipation is not just rational autonomy, but the autonomy of beings who are free and happy, that is, fulfilled. In order to support this vision of emancipation, Marcuse proposes to interpret the struggle between reality principle and pleasure principle differently. The antagonism between the life instincts and the restrictions of civilization is socio-historical, not given for all times and, is therefore avoidable. In other words, such antagonism is simply a product of the historical organization of human society and, therefore, is subject to change. For Marcuse, the subjection of the pleasure principle to the reality principle is due not primarily to nature but to humans, to the administrators of the society.

It is important to note that the purpose of Marcuse's engagement with Freud's theory of instincts is not so much to criticize the contradictions (as Marcuse perceived it to be) of Freud's thoughts.³⁴ Nor is Marcuse concerned with the epistemological aspect of Freud's theory of instincts.³⁵ As has been pointed out in the early part of this paper, Marcuse's cardinal purpose in appropriating Freud's theory of instincts is to provide the anthropological basis for a renewed critical theory of society, one that receives its inspiration from two main sources: philosophy (especially Hegel), and the systematic critique of capitalism (Marx). What concerns Marcuse most in Freud's theory of instincts then is its capacity to provide a model for the psychology of domination, rebellion, and emancipation. Marcuse believes that it is an explosive theory because the release of Eros from subjection under the reality principle would result in a "complete human being," one in particular that could easily be united with the full human being of the young Marx.³⁶ According to Marcuse, the inherent antagonism between Eros and Thanatos and their opposition to external reality in fact point to the possibility of liberation. For that reason, the basic concepts of Freudian theory do not need dismantling, but rather they need to be pressed to the

limits.³⁷ Barry Katz thus argues that this “pressing to the limits” of Freud’s theory of instincts is intimately linked to Marcuse’s constant attempt to ground the historicity of human action. This passage from Freudian psychology to a theory of historicity occurs via mediating concepts, borrowed from Benjamin, like “remembrance” or “recollection.”³⁸ According to Katz, Freud’s theory of instincts provided the content and context of Marcuse’s notion of remembrance: what is to be remembered now is the primal stage of polymorphous gratification which has its origin in infancy.³⁹ This is because for Marcuse, as Katz observes, the unconscious instincts preserve the memory of the past stages of individual development in which integral gratification is obtained and the individual lived in her/his environment without subjection or repression.⁴⁰

But because Freud failed to distinguish adequately between the biological and socio-historical vicissitudes of the instincts, that is, between their biologically given nature and the shape they take in distinctive historical periods and social set-ups, he had defused a potentially explosive theory.⁴¹ Marcuse then attempts to reactivate such explosive theory by detailing the socio-historical dimensions of the evolution of instincts. To do this, Marcuse introduces two key concepts: *surplus repression* and *performance principle*. Marcuse employs these concepts to argue that human history can be divided very schematically into two phases: first, a phase which lasted until the modern age, in which some form of social domination (and so, of basic repression) was necessary in order to deal with scarcity and lay the technological foundations for abundance; and, second, a new phase in which with the advancement of science and technology, which successfully answered the problem of material necessity, repression became needless.⁴²

Surplus repression is a form of repression that is necessitated by *social* domination and top of and beyond repression that is necessary to organize society and production in times of scarcity. It is an additional control which arises from the specific institution of domination.⁴³ Marcuse creates this notion as the counterpart in instinctual and social life to Marx’s surplus value. In Marx, for the surplus value to be extracted from labor power, adequate social structures must be in place which ensure that a surplus of repression prevents workers from rejecting the extra effort demanded of them and indeed forces them to accept these extra efforts. Morton Schoolman shows that next to this first meaning, surplus repression can also be understood as

a specific organization of scarcity through the creation of artificially manufactured needs.⁴⁴

Since scarcity is in theory overcome with modern production, there is in principle no longer a need for any repression. In theory, we could let machines do the work for us. We now live potentially under a new reality principle, with a decisive weakening of *Ananke*. This is where Marcuse's key notion of "performance principle" is introduced and plays a central role. The performance principle is the historical form of the reality principle.⁴⁵ If in Freudian theory it is the reality principle that demands repression, for Marcuse, it is now the performance principle in the guise of reality.⁴⁶ Marcuse justifies his position by claiming that the advancement of science and technology had already put an end to *Ananke*, which is the main factor in the external necessities constituting the reality principle. Marcuse argues: "The issue of scarcity which legitimizes the repression in previous civilizations seems to be untenable now. In the advanced industrial society, the procurement of basic needs is no longer a problem, but it is the manner in which these material needs are distributed and utilized."⁴⁷ In particular, this means that this is now the moment that work can be eroticized, that individuals no longer need to work long and hard but work less and enjoy more.⁴⁸ However, the capitalist system of (over)production and lavish, and seemingly unlimited, consumption maintain the prevalence of a massive and unbending reality principle through the creation and valorization of artificial needs that constitute a new justification for the old demand that working and consuming individuals obey and conform to the dictates of society.⁴⁹

In his reading of Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization*, Richard Kearney observes that even when in theory the repression of instincts could be lessened or lifted since *Ananke* is no longer upon us, the performance principle which governs the capitalist society manipulates instinctual desires through the invention of new (unnecessary) needs as soon as the old (necessary) ones are satisfied.⁵⁰ In this way, old domination can give way to a new form of domination.

Another important aspect of Marcuse's engagement with Freud is the claim that the institutionalization of surplus repression through the performance principle is made possible by "repressive desublimation", a key Marcusean concept that bespeaks of the process of "mass repression whereby consumers come to identify libidinally with the commodities they purchased."⁵¹ As John Fry has shown, this results in the eroticization of originally non-erotic objects, e.g., cars,

clothing, houses, gadgets, and the like.⁵² Here, “the demands of the life-instincts originally characterized by polymorphous sexuality, are permitted expression and gratification in safe (or even useful) form of activity.”⁵³ Thus, the demands of the sexual instincts meet fewer taboos and (this is crucial) liberated instincts can be redirected towards productive goals rather than expand for themselves. However, this liberation from repression, instead of being synonymous with liberation of the human being, leads to even greater subservience to the economic order and its productivist and consumerist logics. This is because domination now is sustained through the manipulation of the psyche, and also because it now provides forms of gratification through increased consumption.

Meanwhile, the manipulation of the instincts results not only in “surplus repression” but also in the eventual release of Thanatos from its control under Eros.⁵⁴ This loosening up of Thanatos from the dominion of Eros can be witnessed, according to Marcuse (who follows Freud closely on this point),⁵⁵ in the First and the Second World Wars, the Holocaust, the Cold War, and all the other destructive phenomena displayed in modernity. For Marcuse, “The repression of civilization had only led to war and domination.”⁵⁶ This is true of all social orders throughout history, but is true more particularly of capitalistic, and even more specifically, of late capitalistic society, because of the increase in repression that is achieved through surplus-repression that directly targets the psyche. Jack Lawrence summarizes Marcuse’s argument clearly:

Whereas Freud argued that instinctual repression of human instincts (*id*) had to override the infantile pleasure principle as the price of the survival of civilization, Marcuse concluded quite the opposite. The suppression of the human instincts had not curbed human aggression and civilized mankind. On the contrary, he argued, it had produced massive human neuroses by suppressing human pleasure in the name of the capitalist work discipline.... Thus, Marcuse found that the reality principle had only increased the tendency of modern societies to be authoritarian, repressive and anti-liberatory; individuals had abandoned the pleasure principle and fantasy for societies that had in the meantime failed.⁵⁷

Marcuse’s concepts of “surplus repression” and “repressive desublimation” thus bring the reification of consciousness to qualitatively new heights. Domination continues and indeed expands in the midst of apparent liberation. This in a nutshell explains for Marcuse why in the wake of technological advancement the revolutionary class or the historically conscious individual disposed

to radical action have been dissolved and became the very instrument that perpetuates domination, and why the anticipated self-destruction of capitalism did not happen.

As the performance principle and surplus repression of capitalist society make work unpleasurable and breed ersatz individuals with pseudo freedom, Marcuse's ideal of true liberation instead calls for a new type of individuals who do not repress their sensuous makeup but cultivate it instead.⁵⁸ Cynthia Willet shows very well that the fundamental thesis of Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* is the invocation of this new type of individuals who pursue a life devoted to "pleasure" understood in the broad anthropological or deep-psychological sense of full harmony with self and environment.⁵⁹ Contrary to Freud's stance that the individuals must postpone the gratification of their instincts, for Marcuse, the liberated individuals are those who celebrate the gratification of the "senses" since *Ananke* should no longer hold sway over human beings. In this way, the human body, the repression of which is the source of domination⁶⁰ (as Marcuse's notion of the "senses" refers to the entirety of the human body) is no longer arrested by the performance principle. The human body ceases to be an instrument of alienated labor. It is no longer haunted by conscience and the sense of guilt, but becomes the vehicle of liberation.⁶¹ For Marcuse, this is the road to the realization of a non-repressive, free, and happy society that Freud had thoroughly dismissed as dangerous utopia.

Finally, the notion of "perversion," tabooed in Freudian theory, becomes for Marcuse a key phenomenon which can be the symptom or, in some cases even, form of "refusal" against the system of control and domination exacted by the (capitalist) society. Perversion can be interpreted as an expression of rebellion against the subjugation of sexuality.⁶² It is the revolt of the pleasure principle against the performance principle.⁶³ In *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse argues that the most liberating form of "perversion" is "fantasy" because it "continues to speak of the language of the pleasure principle, of freedom from repression, of uninhibited desire and gratification."⁶⁴ This produces a vision of a world that is free from control and domination. The products of fantasy in works of art and cultural creations project the image of a non-repressive, free, and happy society. Fantasy is not just future, but also past-oriented; it has an intimate link to "remembrance." It is fantasy that remembers or recollects those moments of instinctual gratification in the past, which for

Marcuse provide the image of liberation tabooed by the prevailing rationality. Inasmuch as Marcuse's notion of liberation involves the recollection of the forgotten image of liberation, inasmuch as this oblivion is due primarily to the near complete inhibition of the human instincts (pleasure principle) by the performance principle (the historicized form of the reality principle) via the institutionalization of surplus repression, and inasmuch as it is fantasy that can recollect this forgotten image of liberation, the power of fantasy can play a leading role in bringing the project of emancipation into fruition.

For Marcuse the rebellious power of fantasy occurs in "art" because the projection of a non-repressive, free, and happy society is basically a projection of the aesthetic dimension, of the beautiful. Art understood in this way is a form of critique. In the *Aesthetic Dimension*, Marcuse argues that art protests and at the same time transcends the system of domination.⁶⁵ In *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse will show that art assumes a political role; he said that art could invalidate and transform the existing pathological society.⁶⁶ Art points to forms of social pathologies and then offers the alternative which is completely different from Marx's "dictatorship of the proletariat" yet akin to the latter's notion of the total man: the individual with the "new sensibility."⁶⁷ This being the case, art for Marcuse is a decisive factor in the struggle for emancipation—indeed, it has become the ultimate form of "refusal."

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Armed with the theoretical language of Freud's theory of instincts, Marcuse provided an explanation of the failed overthrow of capitalism: the fact that "crisis and social transformation" did not happen was because the proletariat as potential agents of social transformation had been integrated into the capitalistic system. Through a critical study of Freud's theory of instincts, Marcuse developed a form of historical analysis that made it possible to explain, even ahead of Habermas's analysis of the diffusion of class struggle in the welfare state, how the integration of the proletariat into the capitalistic system was made possible by the new mechanisms of repression that late capitalism instituted in the interest of profit and expanded production, most notably "surplus repression" and the "performance principle." Marcuse employed

these concepts to explain how capitalist society manipulates instinctual desires through the invention of new (unnecessary) needs as soon as the old (necessary) ones are satisfied, a strategy that guarantees the perpetual integration of the proletariat into the capitalistic system. As I have shown, Freud's theory of instincts provided Marcuse with a model to think anew the philosophical conditions of emancipation: the agent of social transformation is the biological individual inasmuch as he or she can cast away "false needs" and retrieve "true" needs, or, to use Marcuse's words, the individual with the "new sensibility."

END NOTES

¹ In fact, Howard L. Kaye argues that Freud was from first to last a social theorist rather than a presumptuous Viennese physician. He writes: "Indeed, what drew Freud to the study of biology and medicine was precisely the hope of addressing scientifically the most fundamental cultural problems: the nature of man and his culture; the origins of religion, morality, and tradition and the nature of their extraordinary power; the sources of social order and disorder; the direction of contemporary cultural development; and finally, the problem of how to live in a disenchanted and psychologically impoverished world." See Howard L. Kaye, "Was Freud a Medical Scientist or a Social Theorist? The Mysterious 'Development of the Hero'," *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 21 No. 4 (December 2003), 375. See also Robert Golding, "Freud, Psychoanalysis, and Sociology: Some Observations on the Sociological Analysis of the Individual," *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 33 No. 4 (December 1982): 545-562 and Hans G. Furth, "Psychoanalysis and Social Thought: The Endogenous Origin of Society," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 13 No. 1 (March 1992): 91-104.

² See Edward Hyman, "Eros and Freedom: The Critical Psychology of Herbert Marcuse," in Robert Pippin, Andrew Feenberg, Charles P. WEBEL, and Contributors, *Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia* (Massachusetts: Bergin and Garve Publishers, 1988), 145. See also M.A. Casey, *Meaninglessness: The solutions of Nietzsche, Freud and Rorty* (North Melbourne, Victoria: Freedom Publishing Company, 2001), 45. On the culture and the necessity of repression, see *Ibid.*, 47-50.

³ K. Daniel Cho, "Thanatos and Civilization: Lacan, Marcuse, and the Death Drive", in *Marcuse's Challenge to Education*, edited by Douglas Kellner, Tyson Lewis, Clayton Pierce, and K. Daniel Cho (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Little Field Publishers, 2009), 64.

⁴ See Adrian N. Carr and Cheryl A. Lapp, *Leadership is a Matter of Life and Death: The Psychodynamics of Eros and Thanatos Working in Organization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 11.

⁵ Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (United States of America: The Beacon Press, 1966), 95.

⁶ Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, translated by Joan Riviere, revised and edited by James Strachey (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1962), 30. See also Jonathan Lear, *Freud* (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2005), 145.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 31. For more on Freud's Eros and Thanatos, see Pamela Thurschwell, *Sigmund Freud* (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2000), 88 and Paul-Laurent Assoun, *Freud and Nietzsche*, translated by Richard L. Collier, Jr. (London and New Brunswick, New Jersey: The Athlone Press, 2000), 87-90.

⁸ John Fry, *Marcuse-Dilemma and Liberation: A Critical Analysis* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1978), 41.

⁹ Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, edited by M. Masud R. Khan, translated by James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1973), 49.

¹⁰ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 32.

¹¹ See Hyman, "Eros and Freedom", 152.

¹² *Ibid.*, 32-33. But in the advanced industrial society, *Ananke* is no longer a problem. This will be tackled later.

¹³ Barry Katz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation: An Intellectual Biography* (London: Verso, 1982), 150.

¹⁴ Freud puts it clearly in his seminal work *Civilization and Its Discontents*: "The communal life of human beings had, therefore, a two-fold foundation: the compulsion to work which was created by external necessity (*Ananke*), and the power of love (Eros), which made the man unwilling to be deprived of his sexual object...." See Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 38. Emphasis added.

¹⁵ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 77.

¹⁶ See Michael H. Lessnoff, *Political Philosophers of the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 53.

¹⁷ C. Fred Alford, *Science and the Revenge of Nature, Marcus and Habermas* (Florida: University Presses of Florida, 1985), 38-39. Emphasis added.

¹⁸ Freud, *Ego and the Id*, 15. More on the Ego and the Id in Thurschwell, *Freud*, 82.

¹⁹ Sigmund Freud, *Two Short Accounts of Psycho-Analysis*, translated and edited by James Strachey (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 111.

²⁰ *Ibid.* Cf. Plato's psychology. In Platonic psychology, man is viewed as a being who is composed of three kinds of souls, that is, the rational soul, spiritual soul, and the appetitive soul. Each has its specific location in the human body. The rational soul is

located in the head, the spiritual soul in the chest, and the appetitive in the abdomen. For Plato, the rational soul must rule over the spiritual and the appetitive souls to attain a well-balanced personality. This is because the spiritual and appetitive souls are irrational, hence if left untamed would cause destruction of the individual. See Eddie R. Babor, *The Human Person: Not Real, But Existing* (Manila: C & E Publishing, 2001), 55-57. See also Lear, *Freud*, 165-167.

²¹ Cited in James DiCenso, "Kant, Freud, and the Ethical Critique of Religion," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. 61 No. 3 (2007): 161.

²² See Freud, *Two Short Accounts*, 111. In the *Ego and the Id*, Freud "explains that sublimation" is the process by which the ego mediates the transfer of affective 'intensities' or energies from one instinct to another." See Uzoma Esonwanne, "Critique and Extension: Said and Freud," *Research in African Literatures*, Vol. 36 No. 3 (Autumn, 2005): 108.

²³ Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Translated and Edited by James Strachey, Introduction by Gregory Zilboorg, with Biographical Introduction by Peter Gay (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 1961), 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 13-15.

²⁵ Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 13.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 23.

²⁷ *Ibid.* See also Celine Surprenant, *Freud's Mass Psychology: Questions of Scale* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 87 and Tony Thwaites, *Reading Freud: Psychoanalysis as Cultural Theory* (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, and Singapore: SAGE Publications, 2007), 144-145.

²⁸ Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 60. Emphasis added.

²⁹ Sigmund Freud, *The Question of Lay Analysis: An Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, translated by Nancy Procter-Gregg (London: Imago Publishing Company, 1947), 48.

³⁰ Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 73. For more on Freud's concept of the superego, see Robert Bocoock, *Sigmund Freud*, Revised Edition (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2002), 74-79. On Freud and Klein on the formation of the superego, see Robert Caper, *Immaterial Facts: Freud's Discovery of Psychic Reality and Klein's Development of His Work* (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2000), 100-103.

³¹ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 53.

³² Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 73.

³³ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 106.

³⁴ See Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*.

³⁵ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 62.

³⁶ See Peter Lind, *Marcuse and Freedom* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985), 194.

³⁷ Katz, *Herbert Marcuse*, 147-150. See also Herbert Marcuse, "Eros and Thanatos", in *Modern Critical Views: Sigmund Freud*, edited with an Introduction by Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1985): 7-15.

³⁸ Katz, *Herbert Marcuse*, 153.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 154.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 153.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁴² For a powerful critique of this point, see an earlier work of MacIntyre. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Herbert Marcuse: An Exposition and a Polemic* (New York: The Viking Press, 1970).

⁴³ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 44.

⁴⁴ Morton Schoolman, *The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse* (New York: The Free Press, 1980), 95.

⁴⁵ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 44.

⁴⁶ MacIntyre, *Herbert Marcuse*, 49. See also Jack Lawrence, *What is Left? Marxism, Utopianism, and the Revolt Against History* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2006), 100.

⁴⁷ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 84. See a good summary in Carr and Lapp, *Leadership is a Matter of Life and Death*, 93. Carr and Lapp writes: "...Marcuse argued that each society has material conditions that operated as a reality principle. The reality principle can take a different form in different societies. In capitalist societies, the specific reality principle that applies is performance principle—under whose rule 'society' is stratified according to the competitive economic performance of its members." See *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ This shows that Marcuse disagrees with Freud and "...insists upon the historicization of Freud's argument, such that the repression of the drives only occurs within certain historical limits, therefore leaving open the future possibility of a non-repressive civilization." See Cho, "Thanatos and Civilization," 64.

⁴⁹ See Schoolman, *The Imaginary Witness*, 95.

⁵⁰ Richard Kearney, *Modern Movements in European Philosophy*, Second Edition (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1994), 214.

⁵¹ Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children, Hannah Arendt, Karl Lowith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 168. See also Horowitz, *Repression*, 78.

⁵² Fry, *Marcuse—Dilemma and Liberation*, 41.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Wolin, *Heidegger's Children*, 78.

⁵⁵ See Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*.

⁵⁶ See Lawrence, *What is Left?*, 100. On Freud theory of instincts and fascism, see Federico Fincheltein, "Fascism Becomes Desire: On Freud, Mussolini and Transnational Politics," in *The Transnational Unconscious: Essays in the History of Psychoanalysis and Transnationalism*, eds. Joy Damousi and Mariano Ben Plotkin (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 97-123.

⁵⁷ Lawrence, *What is Left?*, 99.

⁵⁸ See Cynthia Willet, "A Dialectic of Eros and Freedom: Beauvoir and Marcuse," in *Between the Psyche and the Social: Psychoanalytic Social Theory*, edited by Kelly Oliver and Steve Edwin (New York: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 205.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 207.

⁶⁰ See Gad Horowitz, "Psychoanalytic Feminism in the Wake of Marcuse," in *Marcuse: From the New Left to the Next Left*, eds. John Bokina and Timothy J. Lukes (Kansas: Kansas University Press, 1994), 118.

⁶¹ In *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse employs the images of the Greek gods Orpheus and Narcissus to portray the image of a liberated individual. This is explained fully in the next section titled "Technology, Technological Domination, and the Great Refusal." According to Lawrence, Marcuse's call for the liberation of the body which means the full release of Eros, that is, the maximizing of freedom and the unleashing of the pleasure principle, does not signify a return to prehistoric savagery but the re-eroticization of the body, freeing itself from being an instrument of alienated labor. See Lawrence, *What is Left?*, 100.

⁶² Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 53.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 120.

⁶⁵ Herbert Marcuse, *The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1979), ix. See also Carol Becker, "Surveying The Aesthetic Dimension at the Death of Postmodernism," in *Marcuse: From the New Left to the Next Left*, eds. John Bokina and Timothy J. Lukes (Kansas: Kansas University Press, 1994): 170-186.

⁶⁶Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press Boston, 1964), 238.

⁶⁷According to Shierry Weber Nicholzen, Marcuse shares this view with Adorno and is "a central part of the Frankfurt School's contribution to redefining and fulfilling human needs in a more pacified world." Shierry Weber Nicholzen, "The Persistence of Passionate Subjectivity: Eros and Other in Marcuse, by Way of Adorno," in *Marcuse: From the New Left to the Next Left*, eds. John Bokina and Timothy J. Lukes (Kansas: Kansas University Press, 1994), 168. According to Timothy J. Lukes, in Marcuse's notion of the new sensibility affirms Marx's vision of transforming the society but Marcuse sees revolution being done "in accordance with the 'laws of beauty' by underscoring the importance of aesthetic needs and impulses." See Timothy J. Lukes, "Marcuse and Ecology" in *Marcuse: From the New Left to the Next Left*, eds. John Bokina and Timothy J. Lukes (Kansas: Kansas University Press, 1994), 200.

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